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Cuba and the Latin American Tenns of Trade:
Old Theories, New Evidence Since the early 1950s,
scholars from diverse regions and disciplines have analyzed the
terms of trade of developing countries. The Latin American contribution to this discussion has been especially noteworthy. Raul
Prebisch, a "pioneer" in proposing a secular decline in the terms
of trade for developing countries, was an Argentine whose career
included a long association with the United Nations and with the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Prebisch's
thinking influenced an entire generation of economists from Latin
America and elsewhere who were preoccupied by postwar economic concerns. Prebisch, along with Singer, relied upon the
terms of trade to challenge the conventional notion that comparative advantage was a country's best guide to the allocation of
resources and hence to the international division of labor. Based
upon our analysis, however, there is little empirical evidence that
deteriorating terms of trade hindered Latin American growth at
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precisely the time (r 820s-r 87os) when large international disparities in income began to emerge. Whatever the causes for Latin
America's "falling behind" in the nineteenth century might be, a
secular deterioration in its terms of trade does not appear to be
one of them. 1
The theory of declining terms of trade for developing countries turned largely on differences in the degree of competition
between industries in developed countries, or core, and those
found on the periphery. Competition among producers of raw
materials and foodstuffs-what Mokyr has called "survival of the
cheapest"-drove prices down to marginal costs in the developing
economies. But in developed countries, where departures from
perfect competition characterized the evolution of manufacturing,
prices would not necessarily fall to costs. The result was that the
prices of primary goods produced on the periphery declined
relative to those of manufactures produced in the core. For developing countries, free trade supposedly resulted in "immiserization" (or "immiserizing growth") rather than in increasing wealth.
Hence, according to the terms-of-trade argument, developing
economies should not favor free trade but advocate the protection
of domestic industrialization instead. As Cardoso and Helwege
point out, this theory served as one of the "most common rationales" for policies implemented after World War II.2
The economic disasters of the 1980s in Latin America (and
the collapse of socialism in Central Europe after 1989) have led
to a sweeping reassessment of interventionist policies-such as
import substitution-grounded in a terms-of-trade perspective.
Dependency theory, in particular, comes under close scrutiny
from those who find little merit in its central notion of "unequal
exchange." Haber and Packenham subject both the political and
economic assumptions of dependency thinking to harsh and intensive scrutiny. Lal has included a discussion of the terms of trade
I Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, Pioneers i11 Dl'l1elop111ent (New York, I984), I75-I9I;
Oreste Popescu, Est11dios e11 la liistoria del prnsa111iento lntinoa111ericano (Bogota, I986), 797-806;
Enrique V. Iglesias, Reflections on Econo111ic De1Je/op1ne//f: 'f(,,11ard a Latin A111erica11 Consensus
(Washington, D.C., I992), IO-I I; Walter L. Bernecker and Thomas Fischer, "Rise and
Decline of Latin American Dependency Theories," Itincrario, XXII (I 998), 2 5-43.
2
Joel Mokyr, The Lc11er of Riches, Tecllllological Creati11ity and Eco110111ic Pro,Qress (New York,
I990); Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege, Latin Alilerica's Eco110111y: Di/Jersity, Trmds, a11d
Conflicts (Cambridge, Mass., I992), 89; John Spraos, Ineq11alising Trade? A Study of Traditio11al
Nortli!Soutli Spccia/isatio11 in t/1e Context of Tcn11s of Trade Co11cepts (Oxford, I983), 2I-69.
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in a scathing characterization of what he terms "the poverty of
development economics." Since economists in recent years have
generally characterized trade liberalization as an important adjunct
to sound domestic economic policy, the moment is appropriate
for a historical reexamination of the terms-of-trade question.
Moreover, as Lindert observes, "The terms of trade are a key
exhibit in any history of the role of foreign trade [and] developing
better indices of the terms of trade for more countries and for
earlier eras remains high on the research agenda in international
economic history. "3
The recent publication of Bulmer-Thomas' landmark economic history of Latin America also suggests that a fresh appraisal
of the terms of trade would be both welcome and useful. Bulmer-Thomas argues that the failure of export liberalism in the
nineteenth century led to slow growth and to a gap with the
now-developed countries. Bulmer-Thomas assumes, counter to
dependency theory, that the evolution of the terms of trade
actually favored Latin America, since the price of such industrial
wage goods as cotton textiles fell steadily after I 8 r 5. As a result,
unsatisfactory growth in Latin America was not so much the
consequence of low prices as it was of insufficient quantities-the
export sectors there not being large enough to pull along domestic
economies (producing mostly nontradeable agricultural commodities) that had extremely low productivity. 4
Bulmer-Thomas' argument is based mostly upon logical inference. What is absent is empirical support. At the very least, this
article brings to the discussion new indices constructed from a
variety of serial sources. We examine data from five Latin American countries. The data for Cuba and Mexico derive from our
first-hand, ongoing research in archives and printed materials. The
Cuban material, which is especially good, includes virtually all of
the commodities that Cuba traded for much of the nineteenth
3 Stephen Haber, Ho111 Latin A111crica Fell Be/1i11d: Essays i11 t/1c Econo111ic History of Brazil and
lvlexico, 1800-1914 (Stanford, 1997); Robert Packenham, Tlte DcpcndC11cy i'v1o11en1rnt: Sdtolarship
and Politics in Dc1Jelopmc11t Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Deepak Lal, Tltc Pouerty of
'Vevelopl/lcnt Economics" (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Rudiger Dornbusch, Stabilization, Debt
and Rcfor111: Policy Analysis for DevelopinR Countries (Englewood Cliffs, 1993), 83-99; Peter
Lindert "International Economics and the Historian," in Thomas G. Rawski et al. (eds.),
Eco1w1nics and the Historia11 (Berkeley, 1996), 214.
4 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Tltc Econolllic History o( Lati11 Al/lerica si11ce Independence (Cambridge, 1994), 78-82.
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century. The Mexican material is less complete but still provides
a clear sense of changes in the terms of trade over the long haul,
when Mexico's economic development was evolving. For Brazil,
Argentina, and Peru, we are indebted to the research of Leff,
Newland, and Gootenberg, respectively. The Brazilian data are as
extensive as the information that we compiled for Cuba. Although
the evidence from Argentina and Peru is suggestive rather than
comprehensive, it lies well within the range that Bulmer-Thomas'
economic history predicted. On the whole, the data about these
five countries enable us to draw firm conclusions about the terms
of trade in Latin America during the central years of the nineteenth
century. 5
MEASURING THE TERMS OF TRADE
The most commonly calculated measure of the terms of trade, the net barter terms of trade
(NBTT), is the ratio of an index of export prices to an index of
import prices. In other words, the NBTT is an index of the relative
price of exports. The point of dividing export prices by import
prices is to express the price of a unit of exports in terms of a unit
of imports. The frame of reference is the base year (always equal
to roo), or the year against which comparisons are made. If the
NBTT improves, or rises above roo, a unit of exports can purchase
a unit of imports more cheaply, theoretically causing real income
in the importing country to rise. If the NBTT deteriorates or falls
below roo, the price of a unit of imports rises relative to a unit
of exports, and real income in the importing country presumably
falls. The difficulty with the NBTT is that it makes no allowance
for the actual volume of exports. Yet, if the NBTT improves while
the volume of exports falls, the economy will reap no benefit. For
example, a hurricane may drive up coffee prices by destroying the
crop, but higher prices (which would be reflected in the NBTT)
cannot help producers who have no coffee to export. 6
The income terms of trade (rNTOT) address this difficulty. The
INTOT measures the purchasing power of a given quantity of
exports over imports. If the INTOT rises, a country's exports can
finance a larger volume of imports. In other words, a country
with a growing volume of exports will likely benefit more from

5
6

Nathaniel H. Leff, U11dCl'dc1Jclop111e/it and De1Jclop!llc11t in Brazil (London, 1982), II, 80.
Meier, bttcrnatio11al Trade and De1;c/opmrnt (New York, 1963), 40-4r.
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trade than one with a shrinking volume of exports. To continue
our coffee example, a country that can take advantage of rising
coffee prices by producing more coffee will be able to purchase
more imports. 7
But even the NBTT and the INTOT have certain limitations.
Imagine that a country's export prices are falling because of a
development that makes those exports cheaper to produce. Suppose, for example, that unusually favorable weather leads to an
exceptional harvest. Even though coffee prices may fall, the effect
on producers is different since coffee is now cheaper to grow. In
other words, the productivity of coffee growing has increased.
The appropriate terms-of-trade measure in this case is the single
factoral terms of trade (sFTT). The data required for calculating
the SFTT are much more elusive than those required for the NBTT
and INTOT. We have made some progress in calculating the SFTT
for Cuba, but the data available to do so for the other countries
in this study are scarce. 8
ESTIMATING THE CUBAN TERMS OF TRADE
We begin by looking
at Cuba's NETT-essentially a matter of dividing a weighted average of the price of sugar and other exportables (such as molasses,
tobacco, coffee, and copper) by a weighted average of imports
from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Spain (such as
foodstuffs and simple manufactures). In so doing, we include the
major commodities exchanged and Cuba's most important markets and suppliers. Since the United States, Spain, and Great
Britain accounted for no less than So percent of Cuba's imports
and exports between 1826 and 1887, an index constructed on the
basis of Cuba's trade with these countries is both comprehensive
and representative.
As followers of Prebisch might suppose, the Cuban NBTT
indeed deteriorated, at the overall rate of r .4 percent per year.
Another way of making the case is to examine ten-year intervals
beginning with r 826, that is, r 826 equaling 100. Within a decade,
7 Spraos, Incq11alisi11,~ Trade, 77; Meier, Inten1atio11al Trade, 42-43,
8 Spraos, Inequalisi11R Trade, 70-74; Meier, Imcmatio11a/ Trade, 43. We do not present any
calculations for the double factoral terms of trade (uFn) for two reasons. The data required
for the nineteenth century are hard to find, and trade economists often question the value
of the DF!T for developing economics. See, for instance, Dominick Salvatore, Intematio11al
Eco110111ics (Upper Saddle River, NJ., 1995), 336-337, who calls the NETT, INTOT, and SITT
"the most important [variants of the terms of tradcJ."
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Cuba's terms of trade had fallen to 86. By 1846, they stood at 77;
by 1856, 58, and by 1866, 44. They recovered slightly in 1876,
rising to 5 1, and in 1884, the end of our series, the terms of trade
were at 52. By this standard, virtually all the decline in the NBTT
occurred between 1826 and 1866, a period during which they fell
by more than 50 percent.
Presenting our calculations by decades does not change the
picture appreciably. In the 18 30s, the average terms of trade were
88; in the r84os, 85; the r85os, 6r; and in the 186os, 48. In the
187os, it was up to 50, and in I 880-84, to 52. The largest decline
measured annually came between 1842 and 186 5, when the terms
of trade fell from 105 to 40.
In essence, there were three temporal divisions in the nineteenth century: 1826 to 1841, 1842 through 1865, and 1866
through 1884, when our series ends. Historians of Cuba will note
that these divisions correspond generally to the key stages of the
sugar revolution and to the Ten Years' War. The NBTT is graphed
in Figure 1, and yearly results appear in Table 1.
A question that sometimes arises concerns the effect of slavery
and the slave trade on the Cuban NBTT. Since the trade was illegal,
it seems impossible to compute the terms of trade making an
explicit allowance for the price of slaves landed in Cuba. However, we can compute the NBTT by dividing the export price index
by the price of slaves in Cuba, using slave prices compiled by
Bergad, Iglesias Garcia, and Barcia. The series, which appears in
the column of Figure 1 labeled "slave" NBTT, differs little from the
conventional NBTT, at least regarding the overall trend. The discrepancies are more pronounced beginning in the 18 50s when a
rapid rise in Cuban slave prices-much remarked upon by Bergad
and his co-authors-occurred. These developments were perhaps
related to the changing market for Cuban sugars entailed by
Britain's shift to free trade in the middle 184os and early 18 50s.
Even so, introducing slave prices into the NBTT does not markedly
alter the Cuban results. 9
Cuba's terms-of-trade series appears to confirm Prebisch's
argument, since the NBTT fell by some 50 percent in 60 years.
Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that these NBTT results are
9 Laird W. 13ergad, Fe Iglesias Garcia, and Maria de! Carmen 13arcia, The Cuban Slave
Market, 1790-1880 (Cambridge, 1995).
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The Cuban Terms of Trade, 1826-1884
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definitive, or even compelling. We obtain a significantly different
result from the INTOT, which did not fall during the period
examined. To the contrary, despite periods when the INTOT fell,
the overall trend of the INTOT is strongly positive. Again, using
l 826 as the base year, we find that the INTOT had risen to l 3 l by
1836, to 171 by 1846, and to 340 by 1857. A sharp fall had
occurred by 1867, when the INTOT was at 277, but it had improved to 400 by 1877. By the end of the series, in 1884, the
INTOT was at 306.
When we present our results by decade, a similar pattern of
improvement emerges. The INTOT doubles from 1826-1829 to
1840-1849; from 1840-1849 to 1860-1869, it increases by 50
percent. Another increase, to 358, occurs from the l86os to the
1870s, declining from that level to 343 in the period 1880-1884.
Figure l illustrates the INTOT's rise-at the respectable rate of about
2.5 percent per year. Even incorporating data from the oft-cited
but problematic Balanzas genera/es del comercio de Cuba (the annual
commercial summaries compiled by Spanish officials for Cuba)
does not change the trend much. Although Balanzas totals between 1851 and 1859 diverge somewhat from the figures that we
have derived from other sources, they too suggest that Cuba's
INTOT increased steadily during the nineteenth century.
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1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
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1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
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The Cuban Terms of Trade, 1826-1884
NBTT

SLAVE NETT

JOO

102
97
92

So
86
87
85
86
93
86
84
87
91
89
90
105
83
84
82
77
74
70
78
78
69
67
53
59

lNTOT

BALANZA

JOO

JOO

JOO

84

J02
96
100
116

J02
96
100
I 16

I I I

I l I

117
119
123
123
l 3I
167
172
176
219
233
241
181
187
137
171
214
206
206
206
222
236
230
234

17
19
123
123
131
167
172
176
219
233
241
18 I
187
137
171
214
206
206
206
252
203
194
198

75

82
70
68
63
76
70
72
71
77
71
83
74
71
84
83
83
82
69
65
56
69
61
58
47
48
49

l

I

These results are consistent with certain benchmark events in
Cuban history. Large increases in the supply of sugar occurred
throughout the nineteenth century; the impact of expanded cultivation and technological change was particularly marked in Cuba
during the 1830s and 1840s. Joseph Crawford, the British consul
general in Havana, confirmed this observation in l 844: "The
increasing cultivation of this Island is almost astonishing. Indeed
it would be quite so could it not be accounted for by the great
accumulation of slaves and consequent formation of new estates."
The decrease in the price of sugar and the increase in quantities
traded were unambiguous measures of an escalating supply. None-
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Continued
NBTT

1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884

I

53
58
54
54
55
5I
48
47
5I
45
40
44
47
54
49
52
55
48
50
48
46
5I
45
48
53
54
51
55
52
48

SLAVE NBTT

50
46
32
28
28
30
30
33
34
30
3I
36
40
33
46
54
42

INTOT

BALANZA

239
277
340
345
349
330
339
332
328
326
254
297
277
307
272
354
358
334
345
305
427
353
400
328
380
342
326
394
346
306

193
188
196
204
343

theless, because the demand for Cuban sugar was price elastic, as
supply increased and prices fell, these changes were more than
offset by increases in quantities demanded. An argument dependent solely upon the NBTT fails to reckon with large increases in
the volume of Cuban exports brought to market. Likewise, the
NBTT does not measure changes in the productivity of the export
sector that were responsible for driving Cuba's export prices
down. 10
TO
Joseph T. Crawford to Lord Aberdeen, Havana, March 8, 1845, F072/682, Public
Record Office !hereinafter PRO], Kew, UK.
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Further observation by contemporaries confirms this point.
Charles David Tolme, the British consul in Havana in 1834,
reported that sugar exports had increased dramatically after r 826
and that "production [had] not yet reached its maximum in this
Island." To what did Tolme attribute this expansion? "Improved
systems of elaboration, new facilities of transport, the permission
of exporting direct to foreign countries . . . the reduction of the
[Cuban] export duty ... the removal of a tax formerly levied on
the internal trade, the increase of capital and consequent decline
of interest, and many other circumstances enable the cultivation
of sugar with profits and even afford encouragement for laying
down new plantations notwithstanding the present low price of
sugar." This last phrase, "notwithstanding the present low price
of sugar," is significant. It suggests that improvements in productivity more than compensated for falling sugar prices. In other
words, Cuban producers increased supply by operating more
efficiently. 11
The British consuls in Havana were shrewd. They grasped
the notion of the single factoral terms of trade, which adjust the
NBTT for changes in the productivity of inputs in the export sector.
As Spraos explains, the percentage change in the SFTT is the
unweighted sum of the percentage changes of relative prices and
productivity. If the SFTT improves, it indicates that the NBTT fell
because of a growth in productive capacity. In other words, the
price of Cuban exports fell because of increases in supply rather
than decreases in demand. This phenomenon is not unlike the fall
of cotton textile prices during Britain's Industrial Revolution.
Table 2 contains data, however crude, to make the relevant
SFTT calculations for 1826, 1847, and 1862. Our results are suggestive. If we adjust the NBTT for changes in the productivity of
labor in the export sector (by multiplying the NBTT by an index
of productivity change), virtually no change is evident in the SFTT
between l 826 and l 84 7. A very sharp fall takes place, however,
between 1847 and 1862. That is, the purchasing power of a unit
of labor in the export sector remained constant between l 826 and
l 846-the deterioration in the NBTT notwithstanding-but declined sharply thereafter.

Ir

Tolme to Lord Palmerston, Havana, August 25, 1834, FO 72/ 43 I,

PRO.
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The Cuban Single Factoral Terms of Trade
IOO

99
6r

Using these estimates, we advance the proposition that the
growth of the sugar economy in Cuba between l 826 and l 846
was hardly immiserizing. Even though Cuba shared its productivity gains in the export sector with the rest of the world, Cuba
(or perhaps more precisely phrased, the owners of Cuban slave
labor) suffered no setback in trade. Between 1847 and 1862,
however, the evidence suggests otherwise. In this era, expansion
of sugar appears to have hurt Cuba, even though the productivity
of the export sector increased. During these later years, the deterioration in the NBTT was too large to be offset by further gains in
labor productivity. The Cuban sugar planters, their slaves, or both
probably felt the pinch of falling prices. Although we have no
data with which to calculate productivity change after I 862, on
the basis of the SFTT, the case for immiserization is, at best,
inconclusive. Falling sugar prices damaged the Cuban economy,
but not until the late r 84os. The clearest conclusion is that Spain,
France, Great Britain, and the United States all shared in Cuba's
productivity increase; Cuba benefited as well, although to a lesser
extent than indicated by the INTOT.
The
Cuban experience may seem familiar, particularly to those who
have followed the debate about the economics of African-American slavery in the southern United States. The long-standing
notion that U.S. slavery was an institution fated to die a natural
death (due to the rising price of slaves and the falling price of raw
cotton) was eventually overturned by economic historians who
emphasized the high productivity of gang labor on the plantations.
The data assembled herein suggest that similar forces were at work
in Cuba, albeit imperfectly.
However, the Cuban terms of trade tell another story,
namely, the competition between Spain and the United States for
commercial predominance in Cuba that emerged not during the
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF CUBA'S TERMS OF TRADE
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last third but during the first third of the nineteenth century. Foner
and other scholars have produced political narratives that implicitly
argue that the United States-Cuba trade was driven largely by
domestic political and diplomatic considerations. To be sure, the
Narciso Lopez expedition undoubtedly had something to do with
the mere l ,500 barrels of U.S. flour sent to the island in l 8 53.
However, our terms of trade series indicates that the best predictors of bilateral trade between Cuba and the United States are
Peninsular politics, in general, and Spanish protectionist policies
regarding commodities like flour, in particular. Trade policies
imposed by Spain upon its most valuable remaining colony appear
to have influenced the value and composition of Cuba's foreign
trade dramatically. Cuba's imports from both Spain and the United
States strongly suggest that trade with the United States and Spain
involved a degree of substitution. Statistically, Spain's share of the
Cuban import market "predicted" the U.S. share; a IO percent
rise in the Spanish share depressed the share of the United States
by about four percent. 12
In the earliest period of our series, from l 826 through l 841,
the United States had the lion's share of Cuba's import market.
The share of goods from the United States in Cuba's market fell
substantially after l 841 and remained relatively stable (from 20 to
30 percent) through c. 1877, or roughly until the end of the Ten
Years' War (1868-1878). At this point, the United States overtook
Spain once more, pushing Spanish trade, which had been dominant since the late l 8 50s, to the side (see Figure 2).
In general, Cuba's relations with its principal market, the
United States, produced a visible trade surplus for Cuba. From
1821 through 1898, only 1828, 1829, and 1845 saw exports from
Cuba fall below the level of visible imports from the United States.
The overall deterioration of the trade balance of the United States
with Cuba occurred at an average rate of slightly more than 2
percent per year when a trend line is fit to the ratio of visible
U.S. exports to imports. The trade balance was extremely sensitive
to variations in the level of tariff protection imposed upon Cuba
by Spain. For example, a rate increase in l 8 3 5 depressed the ratio
of exports from the United States to imports from Cuba by 30
12

Philip S. Foner, A History of Cuba and Its Rrlatio11s with the United States (New York,

1962). The calculations and data that support this discussion are drawn from Linda K. Salvucci,

Ironies of Empire: Tile United States-Cuba Trade under Spanish Rule, Chapter 5 (in progress).
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United States and Spanish Share of Cuban Imports, r 826-r 886
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percent. Spain's revisions to the tariff in I 849 had an even larger
impact, driving down the ratio by 70 percent. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the U.S. deficits increased
throughout the course of the nineteenth century. Moreover, these
changes were undoubtedly connected with the use of revenues
from Cuba to support both the Spanish monarchy and an expansion of Spain's military in Cuba, which was provoked by an
increasingly aggressive annexationist movement in the United
States.
From its origins in the eighteenth century, the cornerstone
of the United States-Cuba trade had been wheat flour. In absolute
terms, the recorded volume of U.S. flour had peaked at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, between r 807 and the early
r 8 ms. It would not again reach comparable levels until the r 86os
and early r 87os. In Cuban per capita terms, U.S. flour exports
would not again reach the volume attained in the r 8 r os until the
early I 89os. Given that the United States was rapidly becoming
an international supplier of grain, and that population growth in
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Cuba implied a growing demand for grain, what explains this
dramatic change in the composition of trade?
Detailed analyses of the data discover that the recorded volume of annual U.S. fl.our exports to Cuba started to drop after
the 1820s (see Figure 3). Using the 1820s as a base (1820-29 =
100), the l 83os fall to 74, the 1840s to 29, and the 1850s to 12;
the l86os show a resurgence to 52. From a recorded high of
l 56,ooo barrels in l 820/2 l (trade years overlapped calendar years
in the export series), there were slight fluctuations in the downward trend to l 827 /28 when Cuba exported l l l ,ooo barrels; in
1828/29, the number fell precipitously to 65,000. Annual fluctuations marked most of the l 83os, capped by another sharp drop
at the end of the decade (13,000 barrels in 1838/39). A similar
pattern holds for the l 84os, a mere 5,ooo barrels being recorded
for 1849/ 50. Flour imports from the United States continued to
plunge in the l 8 50s; this decade represents the nadir of the trade.
Overall, the volume of fl.our shipments to Cuba fell by 9. 7 percent
per year until 1852/53. The Civil War in the United States
notwithstanding, the trend had already started to reverse in the
late 1850s. Between 1853 and 1898, including the period of the
Ten Years' War, U.S. fl.our exports to Cuba (in barrels) increased
8.8 percent per year. This reversal coincided with the consolidation of the Liberals' power in Spain, though not until the Sexenio
Democratico (1868-1874) did wheat fl.our from the United States
recover any significance in the Cuban market.
It has long been fashionable to view Spain as weak and
ineffectual in its desperate, or passive, attempt to retain Cuba and
Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century. However, as a close
examination of U.S. fl.our exports to Cuba demonstrates, patterns
in the United States-Cuba trade correlate reasonably well with
Spanish efforts to disrupt established and rational patterns of exchange. Declining U.S. fl.our exports to Cuba in the late l 82os
correspond with Spain's last hurrah on the mainland-a failed
attempt to recolonize Mexico. Instead of turning to U.S. suppliers
to feed the influx of Spanish troops (as during the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars), Spanish administrators shunned the
higher-quality, cheaper grain from the nearby United States. During the 1830s and 1840s (actually 1832, 1834, and 1849), Spain
levied prohibitive duties on American fl.our. Their effect was
substantial; they depressed United States exports of fl.our materi-
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United States Wheat Flour Exports to Cuba, 1821-1898
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ally. Spain had attempted such selective exclusion decades earlier,
but only sporadically and half-heartedly. Officials on the scene in
Cuba during the 1780s and r 79os often ignored the duties. Yet,
in the r 8 3os, Spain made a sustained and consistent effort to
enforce compliance. Moreover, for the rest of the I 84os and
throughout the I 8 50s, the volume of Spanish wheat flour exported to Cuba nearly quadrupled, while the volume of U.S. flour
exported to Cuba fell by 84 percent, reaching its lowest levels of
the entire century in the r 8 50s. As Crawford observed, "The
enormous duties still exacted upon all flour excepting Spanish is
an inducement too great to be overlooked [by potential smugglers]." A decade earlier, Tolme had specifically alluded to the
near exclusion of the United States while discussing the distorting
effects of Spanish commercial policy on Cuba's foreign trade. 13
In other words, the terms of trade for Cuban sugar were only
a part of the planters' problems. They and, to some extent,
merchants from the United States, remained at the mercy of
Spanish imperial administrators who crafted commercial policies
13

Crawford to Aberdeen, Havana, March 8, 1845, F072/682,

PRO.
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that favored metropolitan interests and agendas. It would have
taken something more than the recasting of Cuba's sugar exports
to address the difficulty. The Cubans were not the masters of their
own destiny.
Spain managed to distort the natural
trading patterns of its remaining colony with some success, but
what happened to the former colonies that gained independence
in the l 82os? Mexico, Spain's most valuable colony, provides an
instructive comparison for our purposes, since its economy was
much less open than Cuba's.
The Mexican NETT appears in Figure 4 and Table 3. Like its
Cuban counterpart, the Mexican series is trade-weighted and
adjusted to annual changes in the composition of trade. Unlike
Cuba's, Mexico's NETT does not deteriorate between l 828 and
I 88 I. In fact, for most of the period, its NETT increased at the
steady, if unspectacular, rate of l .4 percent per year. During one
period, however, Mexico's NETT improved dramatically. In 1866,
when it stood at roo (1828 = roo), the NETT began to rise; it
doubled by 1873. By 1877, a further improvement of 50 percent
had taken place before the series began to head downward. The
coincidence of this episode with the restoration of republican
government after the fall of Maximilian (1867) is striking. It may
well explain Mexico's growing interest in international markets
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. 14
Yet, these findings must be viewed with caution. Much of
the improvement in the NETT reflects better terms of trade with
France, which had a rapidly growing share of the Mexican market.
It also reflects extraordinarily favorable prices for Mexican exports
to France, such as vanilla, mother of pearl, and hides, which had
become more expensive because of severe drought in northern
Mexico. Paradoxically, France, which Mexico had defeated on
the fields of combat between I 862 and l 867, enjoyed its greatest
success as a market for Mexican products only after Maximilian's
death. 15

THE CASE OF MEXICO

14 William Schell, Jr., "Trade and Markets, 1821-1910," in Michael S. Werner (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society and Culture (Chicago, 1997), II, 143 l-1436.
15 Menwria de Hacienda .
. 1879-1880 (Mexico, 1880), 567, confirms this observation
precisely, dating the beginnings of a surge in French trade to l 8 58. Enrique Florescano and
Susan Swan, BreJJe historia de la sequfa en l\/lexico (Veracruz, 1995), 56-58.
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Fig. 4 The Mexican Terms of Trade, 1828-r88r
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Examining the Mexican INTOT generally confirms this impression. Between 1828 and l 8 5 l, the INTOT was generally flat,
with the obvious exceptions of 1838 and 1847, when wars and
foreign blockades annihilated trade through Veracruz. We have
no useful data for the period between 1857 and 1871, but in 1872,
the INTOT was 361 (1828 = roo). It stood at about 400 by l88r.
The purchasing power of Mexican exports had increased substantially during the initial presidency of Porfirio Diaz. 16
Unfortunately, we cannot calculate the factoral terms of trade
for Mexico because we have no nineteenth-century data on the
productivity of Mexican labor in silver mining, the most important source of exports for much of the century. Even so, we can
make a crude attempt to estimate the importance of international
trade in the Mexican economy by holding the terms of trade
constant. According to Coatsworth, the ratio of international trade
to national income in 1860 was about ro percent, or roughly 30
million pesos. Since the average NBTT c. 1860 was about 120
( 1828 = roo), the improvement in the terms of trade between
1828 and 1860 "saved" 6 million pesos; that is .2 X 30 million =
6 million pesos. The population of Mexico being more than 8
million, the improvement in the NBTT represented less than a peso
per person (6 million pesos/ 8 million persons = . 7 5 pesos per
16
The INTOT for r873 through
international market.

1881

is adjusted for the depreciation of silver in the

214

I

Table 3

1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
I 838
T839
1840
1841
1842
1843
T844
T845
T846
1847
1848
1849
T850
T851
1852
1853
1854
T855
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The Mexican Terms of Trade, 1828-1880
NBTT
TOO
97
96
81
88
97
96
95
94
97
TIO
ro7
100
TOO
99
!03
II6
97
ll2
!09
Il7
124
IT3
12T
II8
Tl8
II9
IT9

lNTOT
!00
89
74
40
79
I T4
144
!05
I 3T
T30
NA
75
!04
!03
1!8
ro7
85
79
!08
10
!04
123
97
125
NA
T64
NA
NA

person) in the middle of the nineteenth century-less than three
percent of per capita income. 17
From this perspective-the level of per capita income-improvements in the Mexican terms of trade were barely noticeable.
But for much of the nineteenth century, and particularly before
r 867, per capita income in Mexico showed slow growth, if any.
Hence, the contribution of improvements in the NBTT to the rate
of economic growth was probably significant. As little as Mexico
grew during much of the nineteenth century, in the absence of
international trade, it may not have grown at all. International
17 John H. Coatsworth, "The Decline of the Mexican Economy, 1800-1860," unpub. ms.
(Chicago, 1983).
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Continued
NETT

1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
r875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880

123
120
II8
I26
114
122
l IO

99
88
103
IOO

127
r36
146
150
179
186
200
22!
256
206
302
213
180
176

lNTOT

98

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
361
334
345

NA
NA
341
347

NA
401

trade was hardly responsible for impoverishing nineteenth-century
Mexico.
Both
Pelaez and Leff have calculated Brazil's nineteenth-century NETT.
Leff, who provides an extensive series that is comparable to ours
for Mexico and Cuba, comments that the most important feature
of the index of Brazilian export prices is that "[t]here is no
evidence of long-term declining prices." In fact, he finds that the
Brazilian NETT improved at a trend rate of 0.9 percent per year.
Leff argues that if his series could have been extended backward
before l 826, the fall in British export prices would have improved
Brazil's NETT even further. The story is much the same when he
examines the purchasing power of exports (INTOT). "Between
1822 and 1913, Brazil's income terms of trade rose at an annual
SOME COMPARISONS WITH BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, AND PERU
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rate of 4 percent." The trend rate of growth in the purchasing
power of imports in the first of two subperiods-1822-1849-was
4.2 percent. In the latter subperiod-18 50-1896-it was 5.6 percent. Leffs conclusion is simple: "[A] model of 'immiserizing'
export growth generally does not fit Brazil's historical experience
during the nineteenth century. "18
Newland calculated Argentina's NETT between I 810 and
1870. Between 18u-1820 and 1861-1870, the Argentine NETT
improved by 73 percent. But the improvement in particular subperiods is especially striking. For example, between I 8 I I - I 820
and 1821-1830, the NETT improved 75 percent, largely because
of the fall in import prices. Another improvement of 3 5 percent
took place between 1841-1850 and 1851-1860. Only two periods
show deterioration in the NETT-from 1830 through 1850, and
from I 860 through I 870. The first deterioration was mild-about
I I percent. The deterioration between I 860 through I 870 was 16
percent. Although Newland does not provide any direct evidence
about the INTOT, the rising value of exports per head strongly
suggests an even larger increase in the INTOT. In other words,
there is no support for the declining terms of trade model in the
Argentine case. 19
Finally, using data originally compiled and published by
Gootenberg, we have recomputed the NETT for Peru between
I 8 3 3 and I 8 5 5. The Peruvian NETT shows no tendency to decline.
Indeed, on average, it increased by 27 percent in the I 84os. Even
in the early 1850s, when the guano boom was well underway,
the NETT was 4 7 percent higher than it had been in the I 8 3os.
There was a strong demand for the fertilizer in the United States
and in Europe, where the incentive to raise agricultural productivity to accommodate industrialization was substantial. Whatever
other effects the guano boom may have had on Peru, deterioration
in the terms of trade was not one of them. 20

18 Carlos Manuel Pelaez, "The The01y and Reality of Imperialism in the Coffee Economy
of Nineteenth-Century Brazil," Economic History ReJJiew, XXXIX (1976), 276-290; Leff,
UnderdeJJelopment and DeJJelopment in Brazil, I, 80, 84-8 5.
19 Carlos Newland, "Exports and Terms of Trade in Argentina, 18n-1870," unpub. ms.
(Madrid, 1996); Bulmer-Thomas, EcoHornic History, 69.
20 Paul E. Gootenberg, Between Si/JJer and Guano: Co1nmercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru (Princeton, 1989); idem, "Carneros y Chuiio: Price Levels in NineteenthCentmy Peru," Hispanic American Historical Review, LXX (1990), 1-56.
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Most of the evidence that we have assembled casts doubt on a
declining terms-of-trade thesis for Latin America in the nineteenth
century. The only case that demonstrates any evidence for declining terms of trade is Cuba, and that conclusion is limited to the
net barter terms of trade and to the single factoral terms of trade
between 1847 and 1862. Moreover, in Cuba, the income terms
of trade rose. What emerges from a detailed study of the Cuban
tem1s of trade is not unambiguous support for dependency theory,
but rather support for the notion of a resurgent Spanish imperialism during the half century after 1830.
For Mexico and Brazil, neither the NETT nor the INTOT
deteriorates. By drawing on the work of other scholars, we surmise that much the same probably held for Argentina and Peru.
An argument that links underdevelopment in Latin America to
the terms of trade is not convincing. It is one thing to argue, as
does Bulmer-Thomas, that the export sectors were too small to
do the work that export-led models assume, but it is another to
conclude that foreign trade made Latin America poorer. The
export booms of the nineteenth century changed the nature,
definition, and distribution of property rights, as well as the
profitability of producing goods for the home and foreign markets.
In these Latin American developments, which remain largely
unexplored, rather than in the terms of trade, economic historians
may find more fruitful paths of inquiry and more persuasive
explanations for the syndrome known as underdevelopment.

APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY SOURCES, METHODS, AND
ASSUMPTIONS
Because of the enormous literature on the terms of
trade, we list only those items that were of particular help to us. The
best guide to technical aspects of the debate is John Spraos, Inequalising
Trade? A Study of Traditional North-South Specialisation in the Context of
Terms of Trade Concepts (Oxford, 1983). Gerald M. Meier, International
Trade and Development (New York, 1963) is useful. A recent and comprehensive survey of the terms-of-trade debate and literature is Dimitris
Diakkosavas and Pasquale L. Scandizzo, "Trends in the Terms of Trade
of Primary Commodities, 1900-1982: The Controversy and Its Origins,'' Economic Development and Cultural Change, XXXIX (1991), 23 l 264. A few other publications on the NBTT are also worth noting: Enzo
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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R. Grilli and M. C. Yang, "Primary Commodity Prices, Manufactured
Goods Prices, and the Terms of Trade of Developing Countries: What
the Long Run Shows," World Bank Economic Review, II (1988), l-47;
Hans W. Singer, "The Terms of Trade Controversy and the Evolution
of Soft Financing: Early Years in the UN," in Meier and Dudley Seers
(eds.), Pioneers in Development (New York, 1984), 275-303; Prabirjit
Sarkar, "The Singer-Prebisch Hypothesis: A Statistical Evaluation,"
Cambridge journal of Economics, X (1986), 355-371. For a Latin American
perspective, see Jose Antonio Ocampo, "Terms of Trade and CenterPeriphery Relations," in Osvaldo Sunkel (ed.), Development from Within:
Toward a Neostructuralist Approach for Latin America (Boulder, 1993),
333-360.
On the single factoral terms of trade, aside from Spraos, see Dennis R. Appleyard, "Factor Productivity and the Gains From Trade: An
Estimate of India's Single Factoral Terms of Trade," Indian Economic
Journal, XXII (1974), 36-49; W. Arthur Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations,
1870-1913 (London, 1978), 188-193.
SOURCES
One of the biggest problems that historians face in reconstructing the Latin American terms of trade is the absence of reliable
trade statistics at the national level. Almost all of the Cuban data used
to construct our series appears to have originated in the Balanzas genera/es
del comercio de Cuba, published by the Administraci6n de Rentas Maritimas in Havana from the late 182os into the early 186os. Many of these
statistics were also reprinted by various governments, commercial digests, and magazines (especially in the United States and Great Britain)
throughout the nineteenth century.
We supplemented the Balanzas with a number of primary sources.
The following are especially important: Ramon de la Sagra, Historia
fisica, poUtica y natural de la isla de Cuba (Paris, 1842), II, 81-82 [reproduced in Hunt's Merchant Magazine, 9 (1843), 339-341];]. D. B. deBow,
Encyclopedia of the Trade and Commerce of the United States (London, 18 54;
2d ed.), 521-523; John Macgregor, Commercial Statistics: A Digest of the
Productive Resources, Commercial Legislation, Commercial Tariffs (London,
18 50; 2d ed.), IV 28-29. The non-Cuban sources address the issue of
smuggling, since foreign exporters had no incentive to deceive their
own customs officials about the true destination of their shipments.
For statistics of the United States trade with Cuba and Mexico, we
have drawn on a number of sources. The most basic one is "Statement
of Commerce and Navigation of the United States," an official government document first published in 1824/25, which we used until 1858.
For 1859 through 1888, we employed U.S. Treasury Department, Commerce of the United States and Other Foreign Countries with Mexico, Central
America, The West Indies, and South America (Washington, D.C., 1889),
especially 264-265. For 1881 through 1898, see Bureau of Statistics, U.S.
Treasury Department, American Commerce. Commerce of South America,
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Central America, Mexico, and the West Indies, with Share of the United States
and Other Leading Nations Therein, 1821-1898 (Washington, D.C., 1899),
324r.
For the volume of Cuba's trade with Spain, see Estad{stica de los
presupuestos genera/es del estado y de los resultados que ha ofrecidos su liquidaci6n
anos 1860 a 1890-91 (Madrid, 1891). Aggregate Cuban trade statistics after
1850 may be found in Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "El mercado colonial
antillano en el siglo xix," in Jordi Nadal and Gabriel Tortella (eds.),
Agricultura, comercio colonial y crecimiento econ6mico en la Espana contemporanea (Barcelona, 1974), 322-357.
For some countries, such as Mexico, the source problem is especially severe. However, Mexico's major trading partners kept records
that are helpful for estimating the volume and value of international
trade, despite their imperfections. Great Britain was the major trading
partner for most countries in Latin America. For both Mexico and Cuba,
we relied on the Parliamentary Papers, 1836, XLVI (1827-1834); 1842,
XXXIX (1835-1840); and 1854/55, LII (1841-1851). For the years after
l 8 5 l, we consulted the yearly volumes of the Annual Statement ef the
Trade and Navigation ef the United Kingdom With Foreign Countries and
British Possessions. We constructed indices of the price of British exports
to Mexico and Cuba using unit values (based on the price of exports at
the British port of origin) to serve as proxies for Mexican and Cuban
merchandise imports from Britain. Cotton represented a large portion
of British exports to Mexico and Cuba-overwhelmingly so in the case
of Mexico until the l 88os when the impact of Mexican industrialization
began to displace British cottons. The British vice consul at Veracruz
observed in l 826 that import of cottons, cutlery, and woolens came
"principally from England and the United States." British Consul General Charles T. O'Gorman concurred, writing in 1833, "One of the
principal articles of British trade and also by far the most important one
of American manufacture is ordinary cotton cloth." By l 842, French
and German producers were supplying the Mexican market with fine
cloths, but as far coarse cloth and woolens were concerned, which
constituted the bulk of the import market, Mexico remained a British
market. Moreover, British goods represented a large share of Cuban
imports. Consul General Joseph T. Crawford estimated in l 845 that
"more than one half of the value of all the cotton manufactures imported
[into Cuba], of linens nearly half, of woolens two thirds [were of British
provenance]. "1
The Mexican case does present a special difficulty for measuring
exports. Before November 1857, Great Britain required no declaration
I
Concerning the British consul at Veracruz, December 3 l, l 826, sec British Museum,
Additional Manuscripts 38748, fa12. Charles T. O'Gorman to the Foreign Office, May 4,
1833, FO 50/80B, PRO. Concerning the British share of the Mexican market, sec July 15,
1842, British Museum, Additional Manuscripts 4051 I, f4ro. Concerning British imports in
Cuba, sec Crawford to Aberdeen, March 8, 1845, F072/682, PRO.
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of imports of specie and bullion. Since these items were major Mexican
exports, it is not possible to construct a detailed price index of Mexican
exports to Britain before l 8 57. Hence, we employed an index of the
price of silver as a proxy. For l 8 58 and after, we used Report by Mr.
Lionel E. Carden on the Trade and Commerce of Mexico, C.3875 (1883),
l 8, to derive the relative shares of Mexican specie, bullion, and other
merchandise from 1858 onward. See also Rory Miller, Britain and Latin
America in the Nineteenth Centuries (London, 1993), 73. A search of the
Public Record Office in Kew yielded little data about silver and specie
imports, and what could be found was so incomplete (FO 207 I 43) as
to be of little value. For Cuba, we used an index of sugar prices to stand
for Cuba's exports to Britain before l 8 5 I. We can recover more detailed
data for Cuba's exports to Britain in l 8 5 l and thereafter from the Annual
Statements of the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom (London,
1853-). Data on British exports to Cuba are available beginning in 1827,
as is a series of remarkable British consular reports about Anglo-Cuban
trade in the Public Record Office (FO 72). These reports provide
anecdotal evidence on the origins, composition, and destination of
Cuba's international trade. See, for instance, Charles David Tolme to
Lord Palmerston, Havana, August 25, 1834, FO 72/431; Tolme to
Palmerston, Havana, July 25, 1840, FO 72/ 599.
For trade with France, we employed the series of Tableau General
du Commerce de la France . ... [title varies] (Paris, 1848, and subsequent
decades). Specie and bullion movements between France and Mexico
present a difficulty not unlike that of Mexico's trade with Great Britain
before 1857, since France required no declaration of specie and bullion
at customs. The gold and silver totals that are recorded are only the
amounts that were declared. French customs officials were under no
illusion that declared and actual amounts were necessarily the same. The
problem seems particularly acute later in the nineteenth century, when
the annual totals at French customs do not square with the "official"
French figures supplied by Carden in his otherwise authoritative l 88 3
report on Mexican trade. What makes this discrepancy even more jarring
is that Carden's figures for n1erchandise agree precisely with those taken
from the various issues of the Tableau General. Since Carden seems
reliable in every respect, we have taken his bullion and specie totals into
account in our reconstruction of Mexico's trade with France, in addition
to two other sources for French trade statistics. For a general account
of prices in foreign trade, see Maurice Levy-Leboyer, "L'heritage de
Simiand: prix, profit et termes d'echange au XIXe siecle," Revue Historique, CDXCIII (1970), 79-120. A specifically Mexican study appears
in Bernard Kapp, "Les relations economiques exterieures du Mexique
(1821-191 l) d'apres les sources frarn;:aises," in idem, Ville et Commerce
(Deux essais d'histoire hispano-americaine) (Paris, 1974).
Wherever possible, we have used
unit values derived from the declared value of imports and exports.
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However, since the prices of French goods before l 84 7 are only the
official ones, we had to begin our series with France in l 84 7. Although
"real" values were adopted in l 84 7, the stability of some prices, or their
suspicious rounding, suggest that some unit values for French merchandise may well have been estimated by a rule of thumb. Similar problems
may beset the British unit values as well. Nevertheless, the British and
French data are merely problematic in places; the Mexican data are
either nonexistent or extremely poor. For much of the nineteenth
century, they are nonexistent, as the fifty-year gap in the Estadisticas
Hist6ricas de Mexico, II, 671, between the 1820s and the 1870s makes
clear. The inaccuracies of Miguel Lerdo de Tejada's Comercio exterior de
Mexico (Mexico, 1853) have long been known. See Robert Potash, '"El
comercio exterior de Mexico' de Miguel Lerdo de Tejada: un error
estadistico," El Trimestre Eco116111ico, XX (1953), 474-479.
To measure the NBTT, we had to use unit values for Mexican and
Cuban import and export prices. Hence, estimates of the price of
Mexican exports to France derived from the unit values of French
imports from Mexico, which include cost, insurance, and freight, and
the price of Mexican imports from France derived from the unit values
of French exports to Mexico, which do not include transportation costs.
How large a measurement problem this procedure creates is open to
debate. The total cost of exporting silver from Real del Monte to the
Bank of England, including Mexican taxes and conveyance, was about
15 percent of the value of silver. This figure seems considerable, but
since only 6-45 percent of that cost represented lightering and ocean
transportation on steamship bound for Southampton, falling ocean transportation costs in the nineteenth century could have had little impact
on the price of Mexican exports and, hence, on Mexican NBTT.
Falling transportation costs could have had a substantial impact on
the price of imports into Mexico-for the most part inexpensive cottons.
Because the effect would have been to improve the Mexican NBTT, the
issue does not appear troublesome. There may be more reason to
question the effect of falling transportation costs on the Cuban NBTT.
Sugar being a bulky commodity with low unit value, transportation
costs would have been more of a factor in determining its price. Tolme
discussed just this matter in an annex to his commercial report of 1834,
but the appendix to the report, in which he discusses the impact of
transportation costs on the terms of trade, appears to have been lost.
Computing the indices is straightforward. In every case, the weight
assigned to a particular commodity was its share in imports or exports
in a given year. We calculated chained indices to account for secular
changes in the composition of imports and exports. The index employed
for each country was the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and the
Paasche indices, the Fisher Ideal Index. Once indices for Britain, France,
the United States and Spain were calculated, we used trade weights (the
specific country's share in the Mexican or Cuban markets' total imports
and exports) to produce a final NBTT, chained to account for changes

222

I

LINDA K. SALVUCCI AND RICHARD

J. SALVUCCI

in the geographical composition of international trade. Where possible,
we checked our computed shares against other sources, such as consular
reports. The results are generally reassuring. The exact formulas and
procedures used may be found in SHAZAM. Econometrics Computer
Program. User's Reference Manual (version 7.0) (New York, 1993), 303306.

